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Abstract
This model contains concept, equations, and graphical results for venture banking. A system of 
27 equations describes the behavior of the venture-bank and underwriter system allowing phase-
space type graphs that show where profits and losses occur. These results confirm and expand those 
obtained from the original spreadsheet based model. An example investment in a castle at a loss is 
provided to clarify concept. 
This model requires that all investments are in enterprises that create new utility value. The 
assessed utility value created is the new money out of which the venture bank and underwriter are 
paid. The model presented chooses parameters that ensure that the venture-bank experiences losses 
before the underwriter does. Parameters are: DIN Premium, 0.05; Clawback lien fraction, 0.77; 
Clawback bonds and equity futures discount, 1.5∙(USA 12 month LIBOR); Range of clawback 
bonds sold, 0 to 100%; Range of equity futures sold 0 to 70%. 
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 1 INTRODUCTION
The common concept of banking is highly flawed. In the modern world, banks do not lend 
money out that they have, banks create deposits by lending, which is how most money is created 
today (McLeay, 2014). This fact must be understood in order to properly grasp how venture banking
works. While ordinary banking could potentially do this without the burden of loan insurance, this 
has proven problematic due to the inherent moral hazard in banking. Requiring private insurance 
sets up an adversarial relationship to put a brake on bad behavior.  Taking advantage of money 
creation through loans, a venture can potentially be profitable even if it does not return the loan 
amount in full. To illustrate how venture banking works, I will start with a short story of building a 
castle using venture banking where the castle is sold for half the cost to build it.
 1.1 A VENTURE BANK BUILDS A CASTLE – A TOY MODEL
A private investment bank writes a loan of $1MM to build a castle. This loan becomes an asset 
of the bank. The terms of the loan are that all equity in the castle is the property of the bank. When a
bank writes a loan, it automatically creates new money sufficient to cover the loan (Gardner, 2006). 
However, regulators want to see that the bank has the funds in hand, which is a challenge of the 
banking industry although it is not always strictly enforced. The issue is that the way the banking 
industry developed, there are multiple banks, and a loan may not be deposited into the bank that 
makes it, and as it is spent, it will end up at different banks. What this means is that banks have a 
surplus of funds at times, and a deficit at others. Mechanisms like LIBOR provide for overnight 
borrowing to cover needs. But this method bypasses that, using a method that inherently matches 
the loanable capital term to the long-term needs of investors. 
In this method, the loan is made and a simultaneous insurance policy is purchased against the 
loan. That insurance policy agrees to pay off any deficit should the castle not be worth the amount 
of the loan investment. In this case we will assume 5 years of insurance. The underwriter is paid 5%
of the $1MM per year for 5 years, and at the end, will receive half of the equity in the castle if it is a
return of 1 or better. The underwriter otherwise pays face value of the insurance and receives all of 
the equity in the investment.  
The underwriter receives $250K by the end of the 5 year term. The bank borrows the $250K to 
cover this loan at 2% interest. That works out to a $276K cost over 5 years. 
5 years later, the castle is built. But, there is a problem. 
The castle is valued at only $500K at completion, half the amount of the loan. So, the 
underwriter pays $1MM to the bank, and receives the castle asset valued at $500K. Simultaneous 
with the insurance payout, a lien for 77% of the payout is put on the bank. A pending credit for the 
castle asset value is active on the lien, but the underwriter has up to 180 days to accept or reject the 
asset valuation.  This $1MM insurance payment retires the loan. At retirement of the loan, the 
bank’s books have: 
      $1MM in cash from the insurance company’s payout. 
Debt of $276K on the loan it used to pay the DIN insurance. 
Lien of $770K on the insurance clawback, with a pending credit of $500K for the asset equity. 
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The underwriter’s books have: 
$250K in insurance payments
$500k (pending) assessed value of the castle equity
$770K clawback with a pending credit of $500K for the asset equity. 
The underwriter has 180 days to accept the assessed asset value, deny the assessment, or find 
violations of the DIN contract. Let’s accept the $500K valuation, assuming that the underwriter has 
not found any fraud, deception, or other evidence of violations of the contract. That official 
acceptance means that the base amount for the clawback calculation is cut to $500K. So the 77% 
clawback lien becomes set at a finalized cost of $385K. 
Both parties now close out their transactions. The bank pays off the $385K clawback. 
The bank now has: 
   $1MM in cash 
 - $  276K to pay off the DIN loan
 - $  385K to pay off the clawback 
    Total  $339K  ← Retained earnings on the $1MM deal. 
The underwriter’s books have: 
$250K in insurance payments
$500k assessed value of the castle equity
$385K clawback payments
Total    $1.135MM
Net profit  $135K on a the investment of $1MM minus castle equity for up to 180 days. 
 1.2 CASTLE EXAMPLE BOOKEEPING
Table 1: Venture bank and underwriter. Loan asset shown in suspense with braces {}. Insurance 
created asset credit shown in brackets []. Retirement of an asset or lien shown with strikeout  9999 . 
Insurance asset credit is cancelled when insurance policy ends. 
Table 2: Balancing of Castle example
Venture Bank Underwriter
Credit/Debit Assets Liabilities Credit/Debit Running total
{$1,000,000} Investment loan 
[$1,000,000] -$250,000 DIN premiums (5 years) $250,000 $250,000
-$26,000 DIN premiums loan interest
$500,000 Castle valuation
-$500,000 Transfer castle. Assessment pending $500,000 $750,000
$1,000,000 {$1,000,000} DIN payout -$1,000,000 -$250,000
-$770,000 Clawback lien pending 
-$385,000 Clawback lien, castle equity accepted -$250,000
-$276,000 DIN loan & interest  paid
-$385,000 Clawback paid $385,000 $135,000
$339,000 Closed out investment $135,000
Balance
$339,000 Venture bank gain
$135,000 Underwriter gain
$26,000 Interest paid externally
$500,000 Value created
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 1.3 DISCUSSION OF THE TOY MODEL VS. REAL OPERATION
The differences between this scenario and the full venture banking model of investing below, are
several.  A.  The model assumes that there is a large portfolio of investments which are the pool 
against which the underwriter is paid;  B. The investment loans that fall short are paid at 5 years, 
and the underwriter must carry the payout expense for another 5 years, until the investments 
returning breakeven or better exit at 10 years.  This means that the net underwriter investment in the
above example is $250K plus carrying cost of $250K for 5 years, before collecting the $385K 
clawback. C. In the real model, the clawback lien takes 5 years to pay and accrues interest. This 
should satisfy regulators that the insurance payout is real, as the venture bank has use of that money
until it needs to be paid back. 
Note that if the underwriter sells clawback shares at a discount then its true invested cost can be 
minimal or zero. There is some room for tweaking exactly how this model is executed, and my 
choices were defined to maximize stability of the underwriter's business while being fair to venture 
banks. Keep in mind that if the underwriter fails, then the venture banking system is over. 
The model assumes that DIN policies are written such that the clawback lien is against the bank,
not the specific investment, and that the bank has a very large portfolio set. Another way of working
this would be to have the clawback lien be against some pool of investments that is fixed or rolling. 
This is necessary to prevent the underwriters stacking up losses on a bad run of investments, and 
being unable to collect their due on heavier losses. (e.g. investments that return $0.126 on the dollar
or less.) I have assumed that bad investments will be dumped faster than good ones, and in the real 
model are 5 years is the minimum insurance premium period.  
This method of banking prevents perverse incentives by the bankers to under-assess the equity 
because of two things. First, because the underwriter collects a clawback lien at close. Second,  the 
bank gets credit for the equity in its insured investment after a type of claims process by the 
underwriter on the back end. 
After stepping through building a castle using this method of investment loans, the reader can 
see that the figures work. But some have remained suspicious, because it looks like “getting 
something for nothing”.  “Why,” one fiduciary asked, “does this work when it could be cheaper to 
get a loan from another bank and pay the interest on that?” The key fact to attend to is that this bank
is making a loan to itself, for its own interests. That loan it makes for the investment is creation of 
new money, and in this method that means that any fraction of that new money created that the bank
can hold onto becomes profit. If you rerun the scenario above, but the bank has to pay off the loan 
to someone else first, then it becomes a loss. So this apparently very expensive form of money is 
actually not as expensive as it looks when all is said and done, and allows for loan losses. 
 2 CONCEPT AND WALK THROUGH OF VENTURE BANKING SYSTEM 
Basic concepts: 
1. Rate of return for venture banks is controlled by the base capital of the bank, the number of 
loans that can be made and insured from that base capital, and the weighted average return 
on all the investments. Thus, the average return on the portfolio times the multiple of 
original capital for the bank (MOC) becomes the total bank return. 
2. Underwriter default insurance notes (DIN) have a premium payment, and at exit, the 
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underwriter receives a percentage of the exit equity. 
3. When a DIN instrument is called and paid, it is terminated with a lien on the venture bank 
that rides until exit of a portfolio of investments, or when the policy hits year 10. This lien 
is, however, only payable out of a specifically named investment pool. 
4. Equity value created is the money out of which venture-bank gains, underwriter gains, and 
interest paid on carrying costs cannot exceed the equity value created. In the real world, 
business overhead will also factor in. 
Walk through: 
There are two primary parties, the venture bank and the underwriters of default insurance notes 
(DIN). The DINs are written to pay the venture bank the cash value of the note, and transfer all 
equity assets to the underwriter. 
The venture bank processes its investments as zero interest loans, and buys a DIN for each 
investment loan. Typically, the DIN would be equal to the investment loan amount. A DIN is 
classed as a derivative instrument, which makes its exercise immediate, and it cannot be stopped by 
bankruptcy or court action. For this reason, the clawback lien was created as the last element of 
derivative exercise. 
The DIN instruments allow the venture bank to move their investment loans from their suspense
account back into capital where it is treated as a long-term savings deposit that can be loaned out. If 
an investment does not return the face value of the loan, then the venture bank calls the DIN, turns 
over all equity assets of the investment to the underwriter, and is paid the face value of the DIN. 
The assessed value of the investment equity is credited to the venture bank DIN policy, and the 
clawback base is lowered by the amount of the equity assessment. When the DIN call closes, the 
underwriter receives a lien on the venture bank for a large percentage of the face value of the 
payoff, which is a clawback lien (Hanley, 2017a). Here, it is assumed to be 77%. 
The lien on the venture bank may allow the underwriter transparency into the operations of the 
venture bank as they choose to investigate whether any fraud has occurred. The lien is not required 
to be paid off until the portfolio of the firm's other investments exit, the venture bank voluntarily 
decides to pay it off, or some number of years have passed, nominally 10 years from start of DIN.
The underwriter can sell up to 70% of the equity futures in their DIN portfolios prior to exits 
(Hanley, 2017b). The underwriter must, however, declare prior to each year’s operations, what 
percentage of its DIN equity futures it is going to sell from its total portfolio. This is to prevent 
unloading junk on the public which will destroy the market. The underwriter can sell up to 100% of 
its clawback liens as bonds, and similarly, must sell the same fraction of all of its clawbacks. In this 
modeling, both sell at a discount with perfect pricing. These sales can improve the underwriter's 
cash flow and has major effects on ROI. It also has potential to insulate them against losses, since 
these will be similar to LEAPS futures contract shares that the public can purchase. (LEAPS are 
long-term futures options, typically 1 year .) 
When the venture bank exits an investment, the exit equity value retires the investment loan and 
the difference is made up by the underwriter. The loan is made by the venture bank for itself, and 
the exit equity held by the bank is unchanged by retiring the loan. 
On a break-even or better investment, after retiring the loan, the underwriter's share of the equity
Mathematical model of Venture Banking   7
(here 50%) is transferred to them. When a portfolio of investments are exited, the clawback liens 
will be paid. When the loan is below break-even, 100% of equity is transferred to the underwriter. 
 2.1 VENTURE BANK EARNINGS
On a per VC investment deal basis, the venture bank earnings are: 
   (TotalExit_Equity − Insurance_Equity_Share) 
+ Gross_Insurance_Payout  
− Insurance_premiums with cost to carry
− Clawback_Lien
=============================
   Earnings_per_VC_deal  
To get the venture bank's earnings, multiply the average earnings per deal by the multiple of 
capital (MOC). 
Earnings per deal⋅MOC=Venture Bank ROI (1)
In this modeling, the assumption is that investments are distributed across the Kaufmann fund’s 
portfolio returns at the level of granularity of a fund. The earnings per deal is the average for all of 
these funds in the portfolio.  
 2.2 UNDERWRITER EARNINGS
   Insurance_Premium_Total
+ Underwriter_Equity_Gains
+ Clawback_Lien
-  Underwriter_Payout -  Cost_of_Money_of_Payout
=========================
    Underwriter_Earnings_per_deal
To get the underwriter's ROI, divide Underwriter_Earnings_per_deal by the total cost of payouts
in equation 2. 
Underwriter Earnings per deal
Insurer Payout+Cost of Money of Payout
=Underwriter ROI per deal  (2)
 3 SIMPLIFIED MATH WALK THROUGH
 3.1 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
• Venture capital will make their investments as loans from their own bank. 
• Underwriters will write insurance for those loans. 
The fundamental features of insurance are: 
• A yearly premium for the life of the insurance.  (Here, 5%.) 
• When the venture exits the underwriter receives a percentage of the equity value. 
(Here, 50%)
• When the insurance policy is triggered and paid off, the underwriter receives all 
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current equity, and liquidates it quickly. (Underwriters may choose different 
schedules.) In this accounting, the underwriter net pays the difference between 
whatever the value of the equity is and amount of the investment loan.
• When the insurance policy is paid, the venture bank is immediately encumbered with
a lien (clawback lien) for some fraction of the insurance policy (Hanley, 2017a). 
(Here, 77%.) This lien does not need to be cured until exit of an investment pool or a
time period has passed.  
• Under no circumstances may the owner/beneficiary of the DIN be separated from the
owner/beneficiary of the investment it covers. (e.g. it is bound to the investment loan
and must always go with it if the loan is sold.) 
• The underwriter may not terminate the policy prematurely. 
 3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
• A venture bank can create up to 47 times the original capital using this mechanism (Hanley, 
2017b). However, over time, since investments are made and exited, this 47X multiplier can 
be exceeded in practice. 
• I make a simplifying assumption that each investment is equal to the original capital. (e.g. 
all investments are the same amount.) However, use of calculus should provide us with the 
continuous version, which should model variability as well. If  not, this would require a 
fairly complex agent model. 
• I make an assumption that each turn of the capital yields the Kauffman portfolio 20 year 
average over a 10 year term. 
◦ I will further assume that to get closer to the true internal rate of return of the Kauffman 
portfolio, I should divide 31% by 80%, because Kauffman only sees the net of the 2% + 
20% carry. This should be conservative. See figure 1 for 2% and 20% VC structure. 
◦ If we set 80% of profits = 31% (e.g. the profit amount above return of capital), then the 
total VC profits were 31% / 80% = 38.75%. This gives us a corrected VC multiple of 
1.3875. (The 2% per year management fee built in to Kauffman’s data is ignored here, 
and can account for operating costs.) 
◦ In the more intensive mathematical model that follows, a more detailed correction of the 
Kauffman data shows that when taking profits above break even, the corrected multiple 
is significantly higher, slightly above 1.55. 
• I will assume a DIN premium of 5% per year, an exit equity fraction of 50%, and a 
clawback lien of 77%. These figures can change, and are set conservatively so that 
underwriters will have a strong business. 
• The clawback lien is a fixed percentage. At 77%, this works to produce a smoothly 
increasing profits curve for the venture bankers, and should discourage “jackpotting” by 
deliberately bankrupting investments. 
• I make a simplifying assumption (only for this simplified walk through) that 50% of the 
DINs will pay premiums for 5 years, and then the venture bank will collect its insurance 
payoffs. For the balance, 50% of the investments will pay premiums for 10 years and then 
exit. (For the Kauffman fund data, 48.9% of investments lost money, and 51.1% made 
money. For the calculus model that follows, losers vary from 100% to 0%.) 
 3.3 VENTURE  BANK'S  WALK THROUGH:
DIN premiums
At 5% per year, over 10 years, accounting for cost of money at 2%, is 54.75% of loan principal.  
54.75% x 50% of investments = 27.375% 
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At 5% per year, over 5 years, cost is 26.02% of loan principal. 
26.02% x 50% of investments = 13.01% 
Total cost of insurance over 10 years = 40.385% of average loan principal. 
Insurance payouts in this model are paid out in year 5. Underwriters make the venture bankers 
whole for any investment loan that comes in at less than principal. For the Kauffman figures, when 
we do the modeling math, insurance payouts work out to 13.61% of the average investment loan.  
At exit, the multiple of 1.3875 is the total equity created by the venture bank for each investment. It 
receives this amount, and retires the loan. Note that after this loan is retired, the equity generated 
remains with the bank. So the valuation doesn’t drop to 0.3875, it remains valued at 1.3875 because
the venture bankers are paying the loan they made to themselves off with earnings to themselves. 
Next, for the investment loans that have not been paid off with insurance due to losses, the venture 
bank owes 50% of equity to the underwriters at exit.  However, the underwriter has already taken all
of the equity in investments that are less than 1. Consequently, we don't pay half of the obvious 
total. In this example, the equity the underwriter has claim to is 1.028089. 
1.028089 x 50% = 0.5140445       (Underwriter equity)
1.3875 – 0.5140445 = 0.8734555 
0.8734555 is left for the venture bank.  
The venture bank then must pay off the accrued cost of insurance (assumed to be borrowed funds 
from some other source), which is 0.40385. 
0.8734555 – 0.40385 = 0.4696055 
Now let’s pay off the clawback.  Clawback takes 77% of the extra earnings from insurance 
payments. The venture bank received 13.61% as insurance payouts. 13.61% x 77% = 10.4797% that
the venture bank has to pay back to the underwriter at exit. 
0.4696055 - 0.104797 =  0.3648085 
The venture bank has a net 0.3648085 on each turn of capital. 
Now we decide how many turns of capital the bank will make. Multiply by the MOC to find the 
venture bank’s earnings multiple. 
47 x 0.3648085 = 17.14 
43 x 0.3648085 = 15.68 
30 x 0.3648085 = 10.944  
  5 x 0.3648085 =   1.82 
  4 x 0.3648085 =   1.459
  3 x 0.3648085 =    1.09
From the above figures, we can see that it only takes 4 turns to do better than the results of the 
Kauffman portfolio (corrected to 1.3875 here) that we are basing this model on. And, it only takes 3
multiples of capital to equal the median venture capital fund. 
 3.4 UNDERWRITER’S WALK THROUGH:
At 5% per year, over 10 years, premiums are, 50% of loan principal.  
50% x 50% of investments = 25% 
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At 5% per year, over 5 years, cost is 25% of loan principal. 5 years is used here because after an 
investment goes bad, no more insurance premiums will be paid on it. 
25% x 50% of investments = 12.5% 
Total insurance premiums collected over 10 years = 37.5% of loan principal. 
Total net payouts on year 5 is 13.61% of loan principal. On this, premiums equal to 12.5% of loan 
principal will be collected, leaving a net, uncovered cost of doing business of 1.11% of loan 
principal after 5th year payouts. 
At exit, underwriter receives 51.40445% of loan principal in equity. Percentages below are 
percentages of the loan principal covered by insurance. 
Net earnings per investment loan insured: 
   37.5%  Premiums
-  13.61% Payouts on insurance
-    1.416% Cost to carry payouts for 5 years
+ 10.4797%  Clawback payoffs
+ 51.404% Equity payment from venture bank.
========
   84.38% Earnings. 
The underwriter's multiplier for an ROI calculation is: 
Cost to carry payouts for 5 years. At a 2% annual interest rate, this cost is 15.61% 
84.38% ÷ (13.61% + 1.416%) = 5.62 
However, the ROI multiplier is higher because in the real world by year 5, only a small fraction 
of the insurance payouts will not be covered by the insurance premiums collected. I will not show 
this in the mathematical model below, because it complicates matters, and at this stage being 
conservative is more important. But to illustrate this, if we assume that 1.1% of the loan principal is 
not covered by premiums when it comes time to pay them off, then the underwriter's ROI is over 
77X. 
 4 MATHEMATICAL MODEL  
Computations for this venture bank model performed using Maple™ (Maple™, 2018).
 4.1 VENTURE CAPITAL (VC) VERSUS VENTURE BANK (VB) RETURNS
Here I will use Venture Capital (VC) portfolio and Venture Bank (VB) returns, and these are not 
interchangeable. I use them because the venture capital dataset that I have is for VC portfolio 
returns. Each one of those VC funds is itself a portfolio. When I specify VC returns, this is a 
placeholder for the return on the investment for a specific portfolio. However, there may be higher 
variability for an individual deal. 
VB returns can only be generated from a set of investments using the MOC multiplier. 
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Figure 1: Venture capital primary model. In this modeling the 20% carry 
is taken at payout of the total fund when returns are greater than 
breakeven.  (Used with permission from Hanley, 2017b)
 4.2 ADJUSTMENT OF KAUFFMAN FUND DATASET
In figure 2, two plots are visible for the Kauffman dataset (appendix) (Mulcahy, 2012). The 
upper, gray-green dashed line, shows the unmodified Kauffman data. However, here we want to 
look at the internal returns of the venture capital funds inside the Kauffman portfolio. As shown in 
figure 1, Mulcahy reports them as operating with a 2% per year management fee1 and a 20% carry. 
The 20% carry is taken from profits, which means Kauffman sees only 80% of profits. So, for every
Kauffman VC fund that returned greater than 1 after 10 years, that element of the portfolio was 
divided by 80%. This yielded the red stepped line. That significantly raised the total rate of return 
from 1.31 to 1.55 for the Kauffman portfolio of portfolios. The equation fitting the 1.55 adjusted 
Kauffman dataset is shown in black in figure 2. The blue line shows a curve that averages to 
approximately zero. The green line is shown for informational purposes only. 
 4.3 KAUFFMAN FUND DATASET CURVE FIT. 
In this model, instead of an x axis, there is an h axis for the equations derived from the 
Kauffman data. There are two primary equations, a close fit, and an adequate fit. The close fit 
equation is, unfortunately, a 7th order exponential. This could be used in a software model easily 
enough, using numerical methods to find the intercept on the y axis. However, this kind of equation 
cannot be solved algebraically for h given a y value, so I did not use it in this model. It is provided 
for informational purposes. 
The equation used is a simpler exponential based on the natural logarithm base e. Since 
Mulcahy states that she thinks the highest return funds are from a specific time period and may not 
be repeated, this simpler equation is arguably better, as it flattens the curve. It is also amenable to 
algebraic solving for variables of the equation. 
In figure 2, we see that the fitted curve goes below zero. However, we assume that in the real 
world, the valuation of an investment portfolio cannot go below zero. So it is necessary to substitute
1The 2% yearly fee is ignored. It can be considered accounting for internal operating costs. 
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zero for the fitted curve result below the zero intercept. To do that, functions that invert the fitted 
curve function are needed. This is another reason why the exponential equation (eq. 6 & 7) was 
used.  
 4.3.1 Close fit is a 7  th   order equation regression
−0.377+25.2906120002135⋅h−291.398659319748⋅h2+1671.47290175033⋅h3
−4939.37387988463⋅h4+7727.69689219724⋅h5−6072.99026870706⋅h6
+1886.41489392694⋅h7 (3)
 4.3.1.1 Integral of close 7th order fit
∫
0
1.0
−0.377+25.2906120002135⋅h−291.398659319748⋅h2+1671.47290175033⋅h3
−4939.37387988463⋅h4+7727.69689219724⋅h5−6072.99026870706⋅h6   
+1886.41489392694⋅h7dh  = 1.310174408 (4)
 4.3.1.2 Indefinite integral of close 7th order fit
∫−0.377+25.2906120002135⋅h−291.398659319748⋅h2+1671.47290175033⋅h3
−4939.37387988463⋅h4+7727.69689219724⋅h5−6072.99026870706⋅h6   
+1886.41489392694⋅h7dh  = 
- 0.377 h + 12.645306 h2 - 97.13288644 h3 + 417.8682254 h4 - 987.874776 h5 + 1287.949482 
Figure 2: Kauffman data (gray-green dashed), Kauffman’s adjusted graph 
(solid red), the exponential curve used in this model (black), and the net 
zero adjusted exponential curve used in this models. The blue dashed curve
has a zero intercept of ~ 0.61, and a 1 intercept of ~0.78. 
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h6 - 867.5700384 h7 + 235.8018617 h8  | 0 ..1 (5)
 4.3.2 Exponential regression, adequate fit – used in model
Figure 2 black line.
P+0.2655 ∙e2.88⋅h (6)
Figure 2 blue dashed line. 
P– 1.55+0.2655 ∙e2.88⋅h (7)
where P is the average return of the venture capital (VC) portfolio. 
 4.3.2.1 Integral of alternate exponential regression – used in model
∫
0
1
P –1.55+0.2655∙e2.88⋅hdh = 0.000 (8)
Indefinite integral of alternate exponential with a portfolio factor to raise or lower VC portfolio 
return. 
 4.3.3 Solution of the  h   intercepts and boundaries
Alternate exponential solved for h can give us the 1 (one) and 0 (zero) intercepts. To do this, 
create a variable that is the h axis outcome, y, separate from the h. For both equations, set h to 0.
y=P –1.55+0.2655∙e2.88⋅h⇒ y−P+1.550.2655 =e
2.88⋅h⇒ ln ( y−P+1.550.2655 )=2.88⋅h⇒
ln( y−P+1.55
0.2655
)
2.88 =h
(9)
y = 1 → 
ln( 1−P+1.55
0.2655
)
2.88
 (10) y = 0 → 
ln( 1.55−P
0.2655
)
2.88
(11)
Solve both of the above equations for P when h = 0 and 1, to get the limits of the functions. 
Referring back to figure 2, we see that 0 and 1 are our limits. 
ln( 2.55−P
0.2655
)
2.88
→ P = 2.55−0.2655⋅e2.88⋅0 = 2.2845   = 1 intercept max.
   2.55−0.2655⋅e2.88⋅1 = -2.179689529 = 1 intercept min. 
ln( 1.55−P
0.2655
)
2.88
→ P = 1.55−0.2655⋅e2.88⋅0 = 1.2845 → P = 0 intercept max. 
   1.55−0.2655⋅e2.88⋅1 = -3.179689529 = 0 intercept min.
These functions are named ProcIntercept1 and ProcInterceptZero respectively in the equations 
that follow. They have a parameter of P. 
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The graph verifying  the results of these functions is in the appendix. 
 4.3.4 Revised 2 part equation for exponential fitted curve returns
∫
0
1
P –1.55+.2655 ∙e2.88⋅hdh− ∫
0
ProcInterceptZero (P )
P– 1.55+.2655 ∙e2.88⋅hdh (12)
This equation gives us the net. This is the shaded blue area of figure 3. 
 4.4 DIN PAYOUTS 
The losses integral (eq. 13 & 14) gives us the total amount that the investment returns are below 
1 for the region from 0 to the y =1 intercept. These are the Venture Bank losses, which are the same 
as the insurance payouts. This formula assumes that the underwriter will accept the assessed 
valuation of the investment equity turned over by the venture bank. This assessed valuation will 
lower the insurance payout by the assessed valuation. 
Note that a second reasonable scenario is that the underwriter takes over the equity and waits 
until some n year hold time is complete. This latter requires somewhat different accounting. But 
then, the final exit equity value on the back end goes to the underwriter. However, I think that most 
underwriters would move to sell rapidly. 
 4.4.1 Definite  form of losses  integral
Venture bank deal losses = Underwriter payouts 
∫
ProcInterceptZero (P )
ProcIntercept 1(P)
1−(P−1.55+0.2655(e)(2.88∗h))dh  (13)
  When P = 1.55, function = 0.2054307077
Figure 3: Sample curves for the chosen exponential. Red is the Kauffman portfolio adjusted
to 1.55. Blue is a sample curve for a set of investments that go to zero. Light gray dashed 
line is the maximum probable large portfolio based on historical venture capital data. 
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 4.4.2 Definite form of losses integral for underwriters
(1+ Intrsti)5⋅ ∫
ProcInterceptZero(P )
ProcIntercept 1( P)
1−(P−1.55+0.2655(e)(2.88∗h))dh (14)
   When P = 1.55, function = 0.2279261069
 4.5 CLAWBACK LIEN 
The clawback lien is on the back end after the underwriter pays off the DIN.  It is a fraction of the 
net DIN payout. (e.g. a fraction of shortfall between the loan amount insured and the valuation of 
the equity accepted by the underwriter.) 77% appears to be an optimum. See following discussion: 
Choosing a clawback lien fraction. 
 4.5.1 Definite form of clawback integral
Clawback = 0.77 (77%) 
Clawback ∙ ∫
ProcInterceptZero( P)
ProcIntercept 1 (P)
1−(P−1.55+0.2655(e )(2.88∗h))dh (15)
  When P = 1.55, function = 0.1581816449 
 4.5.2 Choosing a clawback lien fraction 
The purposes of a clawback lien are: 
First, to make it feasible to determine on the back end if the bank is gaming the underwriter. The
clawback allows a back-end claims process after the fact.  
Second, to ensure that there is a smoothly rising curve of profitability for venture banks that 
receive insurance payoffs. Since these are derivatives they are enforced immediately, underwriters 
cannot implement a claims process prior to payment. So, as seen in figure 4, without a clawback 
there is a strong motivation to commit fraud on the underwriter, and intentionally crash investments 
to make more money. Profitability curves with clawback liens that are zero or too low create higher 
earnings at zero than when investments have the Kauffman portfolio returns. 
Fully 89% of the Kauffman VC funds returned 0.5 or better. Consequently I have chosen 0.5 
(which is zero on the VC portfolio adjustment scale) as the lower end of normal operations that an 
underwriter should be dealing with. The normal high end is a bit below 1.875, as there is an 
example of a large  pension portfolio without internal data that has returns of 1.5 . Divided by 80%, 
this is 1.875, which establishes a reasonable maximum. 
In the selection graph of figure 4, we see a set of curves with different clawback values, as the 
VC portfolio return (P) factor varies. To pick a clawback fraction, decide what the lowest 
reasonable total portfolio return is. Then pick a value that has a minimum at that portfolio value. 
I chose 77% as optimum, to prevent Venture Bank jackpotting temptation while being fair to 
bankers. 
The caution is that fiduciaries will be quite good at figuring out how to maximize for their own 
account, and any degree of improvement by damaging some of their portfolio investments is a 
perverse incentive to play to lose in order to make a little bit more off the insurance. I suggest great 
caution in lowering the clawback fraction.  
Mathematical model of Venture Banking   16
Figure 11 graphs in 3 dimensions what the effect of having no clawback would be on venture 
bank earnings. 
 4.6 PREMIUMS PAID TO UNDERWRITER BY VENTURE BANK
This summation is simplified by an assumption that all payouts occur in year 5, and all 
investment exits occur in year 10. So, we calculate the 5 and 10 year elements, and then multiply by
the fraction of investments that apply to each. 
DINrate is the DIN yearly insurance rate. 
Intrst = 0.02    
DINrate = 0.05 
 4.6.1 Underwriter side
5 year term gross
Total premiums if all insurance was for a 5 year term. 
 5 Year term = 0.25 
ProcYintercept 1(P)⋅DINrate⋅5 (16)
    When P = 1.55, 5 year payments total = 0.1151163575
10 year term  gross
Total premiums if all insurance was paid for the full 10 year term. 
Figure 4: -3 VC portfolio adjustment corresponds to ~100% losses for a portfolio. This graph 
shows net venture bank results for an MOC of 1 (no multiplier) with varying levels of clawback. 
Blue line is 77%.  Most portfolios should fall within the 0.5 to 1.875 region. The most common 
good portfolios should fall in the bottom of the trough. Most fiduciaries would choose to make 
more money by lowering their VC portfolios if the clawback lien allows it to happen. 
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  10 Year term = 0.50  
(1−ProcYintercept 1(P))⋅DINrate⋅10  (17)
   When P = 1.55, 10 year payments total = 0.2697672850
Total payments = 5yr + 10yr  (Underwriter side) 
Payments =  0.1151163575 +  0.2697672850 = 0.3848836425 
 4.6.2 Venture bank side
Venture bank’s version includes cost of money to carry. 
ProcYintercept 1(P)⋅DINrate⋅∫
0
5
(1+ Intrst)(5−x)dx +
ProcYintercept 1(P)⋅DINrate⋅∫
0
10
(1+ Intrst)(10−x)dx (18)
   When P = 1.55,  premiums & carry cost for 5  + 10 years is:
0.1210082154 + 0.2983317780 = 0.4193399934  
 4.7 
 4.8 EQUITY FRACTION OWED TO UNDERWRITERS 
This is the fraction of the final equity of 1.55 that the underwriters have claim on. Since the 
underwriters have already taken the equity for all the companies with losses, the underwriters are 
only owed for the money making investments. So, the equity integral (eq. 19 & 20) lower bound is 
where the earnings function crosses 1 (e.g. where it crosses break even). Then the underwriter's 
fraction is multiplied by that fraction of total earnings. 
I can see the possibility that underwriters may be tempted to lower their equity fraction in order 
to close sales to venture banks for VC portfolio deals. Given that the overall performance of 
underwriter DIN policies depends on the top end compensating for the low end, underwriters need 
to model the outcome. 
A safe method of price cutting in a competitive underwriter market for Venture Bank business 
would be to set a formula for equity fraction to slide based on value of a pool at exit. Such a 
formula should have a running accounting for the cost of insurance payouts for the investment pool.
This algorithm could be modeled such that it has good predictability. The only limitation is that 
when a payout or exit is triggered, the calculation must be executable in a transparent manner 
without giving rise to questions that might allow challenge to the status of DIN instruments as 
derivatives. Consequently, making provisions for back end givebacks to venture banks that meet 
certain performance targets is the proper way to structure such negotiaions. 
 4.8.1 Definite integral of equity fraction owed to underwriter
DINEquityFraction = 0.5
DINEquityFraction⋅ ∫
ProcYintercept 1(P )
1
P−1.55+ .2655⋅e(2.88⋅h)dh (19)
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    When P = 1.55, underwriter equity = 0.6475155435 
 4.8.2 Definite integral of equity fraction remainder for venture  bank
(1−DINEquityFraction)⋅ ∫
ProcYintercept 1(P )
1
P−1.55+ .2655⋅e(2.88⋅h)dh (20)
    When P = 1.55, Venture Bank equity = 0.6475155435 
 4.8.3 Results for a VC portfolio of 1.55 (Kauffman's)
Venture bankers per multiple of capital 
    0.6475155435 Venture Bank equity
+  0.2054307077 DIN insurance payouts
-   0.4193399934 Total DIN premiums plus carrying cost
-   0.1581816449 Clawback
==============
    0.275424613 Gain 
Venturebank equity−(Total DIN premiums+carryingcost )−Clawback=VC earnings
VC earnings⋅MOC=Venture bank ROI (21, detail of 1)
Underwriters per subset portfolio
    0.6475155435 Underwriter's equity
-   0.2279261069 DIN insurance payouts total carrying cost 
+  0.3848836425 Total DIN payments 
+  0.1581816449 Clawback
==============
     0.962654724 Gain 
Underwriter's ROI 
Underwriter ' s equity+Total DIN premiums+Clawback
(Insurance payouts+carryingcost )
=ROI (22, detail of 2)
0.6475155435+0.3848836425+0.1581816449
0.2279261069
=5.2235
 4.8.4 Results for a VC portfolio of zero  (-3 on these graphs)
Venture bank 
We repeat the above calculation with a portfolio adjustment of -3. 
Total earnings for venture bankers per multiple of capital 
    0.0 Venture Bank equity
+  0.9987995023 DIN insurance payouts
-   0.2627954404 Total DIN payments and carrying cost
-   0.7690756168 Clawback
==============
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   (0.095811246 ) Loss 
Underwriters 
    0.0 Underwriter's equity
-   1.108171629 DIN insurance payouts total carrying cost 
+  0.25 Total DIN payment income
+  0.7690756168 Clawback
==============
   (0.089096012) Loss
 5 
 6 GRAPHS OF SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
 7 VENTURE BANK SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
 7.1 WHEN ZERO ISN’T ZERO: THIS ZERO IS AN ADJUSTMENT FACTOR
The graph of the venture bank results when the average VC portfolio return = 0 needs 
discussion. It would seem that a miracle occurs here, since you cannot squeeze something from 
nothing. And in the graphs below, you will see VC portfolio values down to -3. So why is this? 
When the portfolio adjustment is zero, this would be a true zero portfolio if there was no floor 
on losses and investments could go negative without limit. In this model, investments can go to 
zero, but not past zero. (See figure 3.)  Because of this, when the portfolio adjustment is at 0, the 
actual VC portfolio return is 0.5 (50%), a 50% loss of invested capital. (See figure 5 for detail of 
behavior below the 0 portfolio adjustment factor.) To get to an actual return for a portfolio that 
equals zero, it is necessary to have a -3.17 portfolio adjustment2. However, here I have  used -3 as 
the lowest value because it is zero out to 3 decimal places, and any venture bank that actually 
manages this feat has other problems. 
I think we are mostly interested in the region from 0 to 1.875, because this shows behavior for 
those large portfolios that should be most common. A portfolio factor of 0 is a 50% loss portfolio, 
and yet both parties can still make money at this level. I assume very large portfolios, and a VC 
portfolio that averages losses of 50% is quite poor. In the Kauffman dataset, 0.5 is in the bottom 
octile. Similarly, 1.875 is about as good as any large VC portfolio is likely to get with current VC 
selection approaches. One might then ask, why I show up to a +3 VC portfolio return. The reason is 
that Mulcahy noted that VC firms have a correlation between past performance and future results 
that is not seen in the stock market. So, it is plausible to think it may be possible to achieve large 
portfolio VC results greater than 1.875. 
Remember that the purpose of a venture bank is to create money for the venture bank to loan to 
themselves. This, and the fact that the investment equity remains the asset of the bank is key to how
venture banking returns work.  
2 While it is possible to create a function that would take a value of 0 and turn it into a -3 internally, so that the 
graph scale shows the true VC portfolio return on the horizontal axis, this creates extra complexity internally. 
At this stage, I decided to avoid that. It also would increase the computing cost of each graph. 
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I show the system of equations behavior down to -3. Be aware that -3 is not quite a 100% loss 
VC portfolio, and 0 is a 50% loss VC portfolio. However, a breakeven portfolio of 1.0 is correct, as 
is everything larger. The function is non-linear, and converges to be correct near 1. I chose not to 
correct this non-linear element of the model at this time to prevent complicating its internals. 
Figure 5: Detail for individual deal returns showing region of low or negative net. The blue 
dashed line is the  results of the investment total return equation, what the VC portfolio return
is without the venture banking mechanisms. Zero on the portfolio adjustment scale is a 
portfolio with 50% losses. Portfolio losses go to zero at an adjustment of -3. The lowest 
Kauffman fund VC fund returned 0.04 shown by dotted line. The blue line crosses 0.04 at 
approximately -2.18. The red dashed line shows the venture bank’s equity share return. The 
black solid line shows the net return with insurance premium payments, clawbacks and 
payouts.
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 7.2 VENTURE BANK GRAPH RESULTS
Venture Bank ROI = 
(Venture Bank equity+ Insurance payouts−Premium payments cost – Clawback)⋅MOC
(23, restatement of 21)
Figures 6 through 10 are views of the same results, rotated. 
Figure 6: Venture bank returns. Blue plane is
at 1, which is breakeven for the bank
Figure 7: Top view. Blue plane is 
breakeven for the bank. 
Figure 8: Side view along VC portfolio 
axis
Figure 9: Side view along MOC axis. Blue line 
at 1 is breakevn. 
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A B
Figure 11 A & B: Behavior with 0% clawback versus 77% clawback. This figure shows why it is 
necessary to have clawbacks. Otherwise, there is a valley in the region where most of the VC 
portfolios are. Most venture capital portfolios should be in the region between 0 and 1.875 
bounded by the red and green cut planes. The red cut plane at zero corresponds to VC portfolio 
returns of 0.5 (50% loss). The green cut plane at 1.875 correctly identifies a VC portfolio return of
1.875 (187.5%). 
Figure 10: Venture bank returns. Red cut plane at zero marks returns that 
correspond to a 50% loss VC portfolio. Green cut plane correctly shows 
1.875 VC portfolio return. Blue horizontal cut plane at 1 is breakeven. 
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 7.3 UNDERWRITER SYSTEM BEHAVIOR
For the underwriter, MOC is not meaningful relative to ROI. Instead, MOC is related to the total
volume of business that can be done with the bank. Let us step through the basic business of the 
underwriters. 
Earnings are: 
Total premiums to underwriter + DIN Equity share + Clawback – (Payout + Carry cost). 
 There are four ways of figuring the return on investment. 
1. Investment is the cost of payout plus the cost of money to pay for it carried over 5 years.
   Payout + Carry cost. 
      Earnings are: DIN premiums + Equity + Clawback 
2. Investment is Payout + Carry cost - Discounted clawback bond sales.
In this scenario, clawbacks, or some fraction of them, are sold, to defray costs for Payout + 
Carry.  
The discount rate of clawbacks will be set at 1.5 x USA 12 month LIBOR. 
 3. Investment is Payout + Carry cost - Sales of up to 70% of discounted equity futures. 
     DIN Equity future shares for this model are discounted at 1.5 x (USA 12 month LIBOR) 
   from the average portfolio valuation at exit. 
Note: Delivery of DIN equity shares will be the responsibility of the underwriter at 
closeout, or an alternative exercise competent entity that takes over 30% or greater 
majority position (Hanley 2017b).  (Underwriter cannot drop responsibility for being 
exercise competent entity without another shareholder with 30% or more agreeing to 
become one.) With an exercise competent entity taking over equity futures, the 
underwriter can sell 100% of DIN equity futures, but that is not modeled here. 
4. Combination of sales of clawbacks at discount and sales of equity futures.
Here, investment is: 
Payout + Carry cost - Discounted clawback - Discounted equity futures sales.
  Figure 12 shows behavior of components of ROI for underwriters
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 7.3.1 
 7.3.2 1. Simple underwriter ROI  
Underwriter ROI  =
InsNetDINPremiumTotal+ InsEquityShare+ InsNetClawbackLien
InsLossPayoutTotal
(24)
Figure 13 shows the ROI if the underwriter does not sell equity futures or clawbacks at a 
discount.  
Underwriters losses begin at -1.4525, which corresponds to a VC portfolio return of  
0.125975915 (~12.6%, or a portfolio loss of 87.4%). 
Figure 12: Cost and income components of underwriter returns. Solid descending red line 
is underwriter payouts which decline as portfolio profitability rises. Dash-dot descending 
black line is payout clawback returned to underwriter which declines here as 77% of the 
payout. Dashed ascending blue line is underwriter’s equity which here is 50% of total 
equity generated. Solid black ascending line is DIN premium income, which has a flat 
minimum where all investments return less than 1, and so within our assumptions, all 
investments only pay premiums for 5 years. DIN premium income rises until all 
investments return 1 or greater, and so all pay premiums for a full 10 years. 
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 7.3.3 2. Underwriter ROI when selling off clawback bonds
Underwriter ROI =
InsNetDINPremiumTotal+ InsEquityShare+RemainderInsNetClawbackLien
InsLossPayoutTotal−DiscountedInsClawbackLienSales
(25)
The idea here is that shares in clawback liens would be sold off as fixed maturity bonds. 
Figure 14 shows the changes in ROI as the fraction of discounted clawbacks sold changes for a 
selected set of portfolio adjustments.  Note that with clawback bond sales, the portfolio adjustment 
break-even point of -1.425 in the previous simple accounting is only stable at approximately -0.25. 
Figure 13: Detail view of simple underwriter earnings without sales of 
clawbacks or equity futures. ROI becomes meaningless where VC 
portfolio scale is above 2. Breakeven is at -1.425
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Figure 15 shows how ROI varies with both clawback bond sales and adjustments of the 
portfolio returns for individual deals. The blue plane is at 1, which is break even.  The zero 
clawback sales graph in gray is shown together with the color shading sales graph. When the color 
shaded graph ends while ascending, ROI becomes meaningless due to zero net cost of insurance 
payouts. 
Figure 14: VC portfolio adjustment numbers are shown next to the lines on the right. Note 
that here, a portfolio adjustment of -0.25 (black line) is flat. Everything below this, ROI 
trends down the larger the clawbacks fraction sold. Everything above it, the ROI rises the 
more are sold. Compare with figure 23. 
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 7.3.4 3. Underwriter ROI with sales of equity futures 
Underwriter ROI =
InsNetDINPremiumTotal+ InsNetClawbackLien+RemainderDiscountedInsEquitySales
InsLossPayoutTotal−DiscountedInsEquitySales
(26)
Figures 16 and 17 show how ROI varies with  equity futures sales while the VC portfolio 
adjustment goes from -3 to 3. In the region of higher VC portfolio return in figure 16 beyond the 
spikes, there is no cost, only earnings. 
Figure 15: Varying sales of discounted clawback bonds. With sales, ROI 
rises a little faster above the -0.25 transition. But below -0.25, it drops 
below break-even, and has worse results than without. 
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Figure 16: Comparison of sales of equity futures with no sales (in gray). The significance of this 
graph is, again, that ROI rises faster above the critical transition, and below it, drops more 
quickly. 
Figure 17: Detail of discounted equity futures sales. Here we see the transition region more 
clearly as the color shaded sales graph dips dips below the gray non-sales graph. 
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 7.3.5 4. Underwriter ROI with sales of both clawback bonds and equity futures 
Underwriter ROI =
InsNetDINPremiumTotal+RemainderInsNetClawbackLien+RemainderDiscountedInsEquitySales
InsLossPayoutTotal – DiscountedInsClawbackLienSales−DiscountedInsEquitySales
(27)
Figures 18-23 vary the VC portfolio adjustment from -3 ( zero return)  to +2. Above 2.14 there 
is no graph, which means there is no net cost to the business. 
The region past where the graph spikes end is all earnings and ROI is meaningless. Remember 
that a VC portfolio adjustment of 1 is 1, and everything above that is likewise correct. But below 1, 
the portfolio adjustment becomes inaccurate. A portfolio adjustment of 0 is a VC portfolio return of 
-0.5, or a 50% loss. A portfolio adjustment of -3, is a VC portfolio of zero. 
Figure 18: VC portfolio adjustment = -3 to 
-1.5. Blue cut plan at breakeven. 
Figure 19: VC portfolio adjustment = -1.5 to
0.0.
Figure 21: VC portfolio adjustment = 0.8 to 
1.4. 
Figure 20: VC portfolio adjustment = 0.0 to 
0.8. Blue cut plane at breakeven. 
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 7.3.6 Combined graphs for underwriter sales of both clawback bonds and equity futures
Figures 22 and 23 show how ROI varies based on cash flow as affected by sales of clawback 
bonds and discounted equity futures at selected VC portfolio adjustments together in one graph. 
 7.3.7  
Figure 22: VC portfolio adjustment = 0.2 to 2.0  
Figure 23: VC portfolio adjustment = -3 to 0.2   
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 8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a reasonably normal operating environment, the optimum strategy for the underwriters will be
to sell equity futures off early. This will generate revenue, and insulate the underwriter from 
markets over time. There is plenty of time to do this, so underwriters should be in a good position to
establish a market for new issues. Because of this, I would expect that equity futures should usually 
fetch a significantly better price than the perfect fore-knowledge calculation of this model. 
A further benefit of sales of equity futures is that these can be used to establish a surrogate 
pricing for the underlying investments. If this can be established, it may be usable for creating 
alternative exits, such as leveraged buy outs for those small number of investments that are not 
ready to retire at 10 years. Such transactions would have to be done outside of the venture banking 
system. 
If all the clawbacks are sold off then the underwriter loses transparency into the venture bank’s 
records relative to that investment. If there is any reason to want to maintain transparency, then that 
should be avoided. Like the equity futures, this should significantly improve ROI, and provide an 
earlier conversion to an effectively zero cost business. 
I expect that payoff occurrences will exhibit clustering, and should skew toward early payoffs 
for three reasons. 
• First, Kauffman's data shows that funds exhibiting losses are concentrated in a rough 
quartile, and that past performance of a fund's managers was a good predictor of future 
performance. 
• Second, when insurance is held, VC managers will have less incentive to hold investments 
that they think won't get to break even because it is costing them the insurance premium to 
maintain the investment. This will be balanced to some extent by the requirement to keep 
paying on the policy for a minimum term. 
• Third, my assumption that VCs only take the 20% carry on their positive gain portfolios is a 
conservative assumption. The true venture capital performance internally may be 
significantly higher. 
There will be performance impact for individual investment returns on venture bank portfolios 
due to paying for insurance on investments. Against the incentive to cut losses earlier due to 
maintenance of insurance, the venture bank will want to maximize the value of that investment in 
order to minimize losses because of the clawback lien credits. I think that for the venture banks, this
will probably improve performance relative to current VC firms. 
It will be necessary for an underwriter to set minimum insurance terms, I suggest 5 years, to 
prevent dumping early. I could see the possibility that underwriters could get hit with some of their 
clients paying 1 year of insurance and dumping investments in order to minimize their insurance 
costs while maximizing payoffs on dumped investments. This scenario would damage underwriter's
returns, and has potential to undermine the stability of the venture-bank system. Against this, if 
underwriters maintain a back end claims process during some portion of the clawback period, such 
activity can be treated as a violation of fiduciary trust, and result in a higher clawback up to 100%, 
and possibly including penalties above and beyond the clawback amount. 
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 9 APPENDIX
 9.1 KAUFFMAN DATASET
Octiles marked with shading. 
Vector([0.04, .10, .10, .15, .15, .20, .30, .30, .30, .30, .40, .50, .60, .60, .60, .65, .65, .65, .65, .65,
.65, .65, .70, .70, .70, .70, .75, .75, .75, .75, .75, .75, .80, .80, .85, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90,
.90, .90, .90, .90, .99, .99, .99, 1.05, 1.10, 1.10, 1.10, 1.10, 1.10, 1.20, 1.20, 1.24, 1.25, 1.25, 1.30, 
1.30, 1.30, 1.30, 1.35, 1.35, 1.35, 1.35, 1.35, 1.35, 1.40, 1.50, 1.50, 1.50, 1.60, 1.60, 1.70, 1.70, 
1.70, 1.70, 1.70, 1.80, 2.10, 2.10, 2.20, 2.20, 2.20, 2.20, 2.30, 2.30, 2.30, 2.60, 3.00, 3.20, 3.20, 
3.20, 3.80, 6.00, 8.00], datatype = float)  Mean average = 1.31
 9.2 KAUFFMAN REVISED DATASET 
Values are identical until they are greater than or equal to 1. Values above 1 are divided by 0.8. 
Octiles marked with shading. 
Vector([0.04, .10, .10, .15, .15, .20, .30, .30, .30, .30, .40, .50, .60, .60, .60, .65, .65, .65, .65, .65,
.65, .65, .70, .70, .70, .70, .75, .75, .75, .75, .75, .75, .80, .80, .85, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90, .90,
.90, .90, .90, .90, .99, .99, .99, 1.3125, 1.375, 1.375, 1.375, 1.375, 1.375, 1.5, 1.5, 1.55, 1.5625, 
1.5625, 1.625, 1.625, 1.625, 1.625, 1.6875, 1.6875, 1.6875, 1.6875, 1.6875, 1.6875, 1.75, 1.875, 
1.875, 1.875, 2.0, 2.0, 2.125, 2.125, 2.125, 2.125, 2.125, 2.25, 2.625, 2.625, 2.75, 2.75, 2.75, 2.75, 
2.875, 2.875, 2.875, 3.25, 3.75, 4, 4, 4, 4.75, 7.5, 10], datatype = float) Mean average = 1.555725 
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